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Episodic memory is the ability to consciously recollect personal past events. This type
of memory has been tested in non-human animals by using depletion paradigms that
assess whether they can remember the “what,” “where,” and “when” (i.e., how long ago)
of a past event. An important limitation of these behavioral paradigms is that they do
not clearly identify the cognitive mechanisms (e.g., episodic memory, semantic memory)
that underlie task success. Testing adult humans in a depletion paradigm will help to
shed light on this issue. In two experiments, we presented university undergraduates
with a depletion paradigm which involved choosing one of two food snacks—a preferred
but perishable food and a less preferred but non-perishable food–either after a short or
a long interval. Whereas, in Experiment 1, participants were asked to imagine the time
between hiding the food items and choosing one of them; in Experiment 2 participants
experienced the time elapsed between hiding the food items and choosing one of them.
In addition, in Experiment 2 participants were presented with 2 trials which allowed us
to investigate the role of previous experience in depletion paradigms. Results across
both experiments showed that participants chose the preferred and perishable food
(popsicle) after the short interval but did not choose the less preferred and non-perishable
food (raisins) after the long interval. Crucially, in Experiment 2 experiencing the melted
popsicle in Trial l improved participants’ performance in Trial 2. We discuss our results
in the context of how previous experience affects performance in depletion tasks. We
also argue that variations in performance on “episodic-like memory” tasks may be due
to different definitions and assessment criteria of the “when” component.
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INTRODUCTION
Episodic memory is a form of declarative memory that allows people to recall personally
experienced events (Tulving, 1983). Importantly, episodic recollection is entwined with a particular
phenomenological experience that allows a person to mentally travel back in time to re-experience
a past episode—or, so-called autonoetic awareness (Tulving, 1983)—and to be aware of “. . . the
temporal dimension of their own and others’ existence. . . ” –referred to as chronosthesia (Tulving,
2002, p. 313).
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A wide range of language-based paradigms (e.g., word lists,
mental imagery tasks, navigation tasks, autobiographicalmemory
questionnaires) have been used to investigate episodic memory
in human adults (e.g., Tulving, 1972; Williams and Broadbent,
1986; Hassabis et al., 2007; Mullally et al., 2012). In most of these
paradigms, participants are asked to describe the content of a
memory and the subjective experience (i.e., type of awareness)
associated with remembering this content (e.g., Levine et al.,
2002; Buckner and Carroll, 2007).
There is no doubt that participants in such tasks are retrieving
episodic memories. Nonetheless, researchers have little control
over how participants have formed these memories or how
often these memories have been retrieved (Pause et al., 2013).
Recent studies have also shown a lack of inter-task relations
thus calling into question the extent to which these different
measures tap the same type of memory (e.g., Cheke and Clayton,
2013, 2015). In addition, relying exclusively on language-based
tasks poses important challenges for testing episodic memory
in non-verbal populations (e.g., pre-verbal children, non-human
animals), and thus precludes making important comparisons
across development and across species.
In order to overcome some of these limitations, there has
recently been an increasing interest in developing non-language-
based tasks grounded on the behavioral components of episodic
memory. These tasks usually take the form of assessing the ability
to remember what happened, where, and when (Tulving, 1972),
and have been adapted from a depletion paradigm that was first
developed for use with birds (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). In
their study, Clayton and Dickinson had scrub-jays (Aphelocoma
californica) cache two types of food in different locations—
preferred, but perishable, wax worms, and less-preferred, but
non-perishable, peanuts. Importantly, the scrub jays could either
recover the food after a short or long retention interval. At
recovery, scrub-jays searched for worms after a short time had
passed since caching, but switched to peanuts after a long time
had elapsed since caching. Thus, birds successfully recalled the
type of food they had cached (i.e., “what”), its location (i.e.,
“where”), and how long ago (i.e., “when”) they had cached
it (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). Because the paradigm did
not directly assess the phenomenological components of the
scrub-jays’ memories, the authors concluded that scrub-jays had
“episodic-like memories.”
Recent studies have shown that in “episodic-like” memory
paradigms human adults also recall what, where, and when
something happened (e.g., Pause et al., 2010; Plancher et al.,
2010; Holland and Smulders, 2011; Easton et al., 2012; Cheke
and Clayton, 2013; Mazurek et al., 2015; Craig et al., 2016). In
these studies, participants are usually asked to recall, for example,
in which room (e.g., Holland and Smulders, 2011; Craig et al.,
2016) or quadrant of a computer screen (Pause et al., 2010)
(i.e., “where”) and in which order (i.e., “when”) coins (e.g.,
Holland and Smulders, 2011; Craig et al., 2016) or visual stimuli
(Pause et al., 2010) (i.e., “what”) were hidden or seen before.
Crucially, adults’ successful performance in these tasks has been
interpreted as evidence that the what-where-when paradigms
rely on episodic memory. However, Martin-Ordas et al. (2017)
have suggested that there are at least two important differences
between the studies with humans and Clayton and Dickinson
(1998) depletion paradigm: (1) the definition of the “when”
component, and (2) the behavioral criteria used to assess episodic
memory.
In the studies with humans conducted thus far, “when”
is defined as the “order” of events (henceforth “what-where-
in which order” paradigms), whereas in the studies with the
scrub-jays, it is defined as “how long ago” an event took
place (henceforth “what-where-how long ago” paradigm). This
difference in the definition of the “when” component is a
particularly relevant issue because it has been argued that
the “how long ago” component does not necessarily test
chronosthesiawhich, as mentioned earlier, Tulving (2002) defined
as a critical feature of episodic memory (e.g., McCormack,
2001; Roberts et al., 2008). For example, Roberts et al. (2008)
suggested that in a what-where-how long ago paradigm “instead
of remembering when an event happened within a framework
of past time, animals are keeping track of how much time has
elapsed since caching or encountering a particular food item
at a particular place and are using elapsed time to indicate
return to or avoidance of that location” (p. 113). Thus, even if
successful performance in what-where-in which order tasks relies
on episodic memory, the same might not be true for successful
performance in the what-where-how long ago task.
As for the behavioral criterion used to assess episodicmemory,
Clayton and Dickinson (1998) measured scrub-jays’ correct
choices (i.e., choosing worms after the short retention interval,
and peanuts after the long retention interval). In contrast,
humans’ episodic memories are usually measured by their verbal
responses to the “what” (e.g., coins), “where” (e.g., in which
room), and “when/in which order” (e.g., order in which the coins
were hidden) questions (although see Pause et al., 2010 and Pause
et al., 2013 for exceptions). Thus, in these studies, no measure
of whether or not participants use duration to make choices
(e.g., choose the preferred food after a short interval and the
less preferred food after a long interval) was included- this being
the crucial measure in the episodic-like memory paradigms used
with non-human animals.
In order to address these two issues,Martin-Ordas et al. (2017)
developed a what-where-how long ago depletion paradigm for
children in which correct choices as well as responses to “what,”
“where,” and “how long ago” questions were assessed. In two
trials, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were presented with a preferred
food (i.e., popsicle) that was only edible after a short interval,
and a less preferred food (i.e., raisins) that was edible after
both short and long intervals. To make a successful choice,
children had to remember what food item was hidden where
as well as how much time had elapsed between the hiding of
the two food items. Results showed that children chose their
preferred food after the short intervals but, strikingly, did not
select their less-preferred food after the long intervals. Consistent
with previous findings, however, age-related changes in children’s
ability to remember “what” was hidden “where” were found.
Nonetheless, children struggled at estimating the duration of the
trials—a potential explanation for why they failed to make the
correct critical choice in the depletion paradigm. However, a
more controversial interpretation of Martin-Ordas et al.’s (2017)
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findings is that what-where-how long ago depletion paradigms
do not necessarily rely on episodic memory.
One way to address this issue is to test human adults in the
what-where-how long ago task previously used with preschool
children. This is because adults not only have episodic memories
but also have less difficulty at estimating temporal duration.
In two experiments, we presented adult participants with a
depletion task which involved choosing a food snack either after
3-min or 1-h. In Experiment 1 participants were asked to imagine
the time between the hiding of the food items (a preferred but
perishable grape popsicle and a less-preferred but non-perishable
box of raisins) and choosing one of them. Successful performance
would depend on participants’ memory for what and where as
well as on their ability to integrate temporal information into
their decision-making process. In Experiment 2, participants
experienced the time elapsed between the hiding of the food
items and choosing one of them. Thus, Experiment 2 allowed
us to assess whether adults would remember and incorporate
temporal information to guide their choices in what-where-how
long ago tasks. Participants’ success would support the claim that
depletion paradigms assess episodic thinking.
EXPERIMENT 1: QUESTIONNAIRE
VERSION
We developed a questionnaire version of Martin-Ordas et al.’s
(2017) procedure with children. On a screen in a lecture theater,
participants were shown the setup used by Martin-Ordas et al.
(2017) (i.e., an image of a table with three opaque boxes) and
the images of two snacks: a preferred but perishable grape
popsicle and a less-preferred but non-perishable box of raisins.
Participants were asked to imagine that the two snacks were
hidden under two of three boxes. Next, each participant was
provided with a questionnaire in which they were asked to
imagine choosing one of the three containers either after 3-min
or 1-h. Correct responses (i.e., choosing the popsicle after 3-
min and the raisins after 1-h) would indicate that adults are
able to integrate “what,” “where,” and “when” information (i.e.,
hypothetical temporal distance between hiding the snacks and
having to choose a container).
Methods
Participants
An opportunistic sample of 84 University undergraduates was
tested; 23 were excluded due to food preference (e.g., they did not
like raisins, they liked raisins more than popsicles), resulting in a
final sample of 61 (46 females; 15 males). All participants were
predominantly White, and fluent in English. Participants were
informed that participation was voluntary and that they could
leave the lecture theater if they did not want to participate in the
study.
Materials and Procedure
On a projector screen, we presented the images of a popsicle,
a box of raisins, and a platform with three opaque cardboard
boxes on top of it. Each participant was provided with a two-page
questionnaire containing (1) a food preference test (page 1), (2) a
critical choice question, andmemory check questions (page 2).
1. Food preference test. The images of a popsicle and a box of
raisins were shown to the participants and they were told
“Imagine that I have a popsicle and a box of raisins.” Next
participants were asked to look at page 1 of the questionnaire
and answer the questions on it: (1) Do you like popsicles?
Yes/No, (2) Do you like raisins? Yes/No, (3) What do you
like best: popsicles or raisins? Participants were told not to
share their answers with their classmates and they were asked
to turn the paper over once they finished answering the
questions.
2. Critical choice question and memory-check questions. Next,
the image of a platform with three boxes on it was shown
to the participants, and the Experimenter (E) said “Imagine
that I am going to hide the popsicle under the right box, the
raisins under the left box and the box in the middle remains
empty.” Then, participants were asked to look at page 2 of the
questionnaire and answer the questions: (1) Imagine that in 1-
h/3min you can have what is inside one of these boxes: which
one would you choose? Left box/Middle box/Right box; (2) Do
you remember which box has the popsicle? Left box/ Middle
box/ Right box; (3)Do you remember which box has the raisins?
Left box/ Middle box/ Right box. Participants were again told
not to share their answers with their classmates and they were
asked to turn over the paper once they finished answering the
questions.
Scoring and Analyses
Critical choice question
If participants selected the correct box, they received a score of 1,
whereas if they selected an incorrect box, they received a score of
0. As in the depletion paradigms, choosing the box that contained
the popsicle in the 3-min trials was scored as “correct” because
it is the preferred food and is still edible, whereas choosing
the empty box or the box containing the raisins was scored
as “incorrect.” In contrast, in the 1-h trials, choosing the box
containing the raisins was considered “correct,” and choosing the
empty box or the box containing the popsicle (which would have
melted and thus no longer be edible) was considered “incorrect.”
Memory-check questions (i.e., “do you remember where the
popsicle is? do you remember where the raisins are?”)
Participants received a score of 1 if they answered that the box
on the right contained the popsicle, and that the box on the left
contained raisins. Any other response was scored as 0.
Analyses
We used Pearson chi-square tests to analyze performance in the
critical choice question. We used binomial tests to assess whether
participants were above chance in the critical choice question and
memory check questions (chance = 33%). All statistical tests
were exact two-tailed, and results were considered significant if
p< 0.05.
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Results
Critical Choice Question
Participants performed significantly better in the 3-min trial
compared to the 1-h trial (χ2 = 15.74, df = 1, p < 0.001).
Binomial tests indicated that participants chose the box
containing the popsicle significantly above chance in the 3-min
trial (p < 0.001) but failed to choose the box containing the
raisins significantly above chance in the 1-h trial (p = 0.87). In
fact, 76% of the adult participants chose the box containing the
popsicle after 1-h (p< 0.001) (see Figure 1).
Memory-Check Questions (“What Is Where”)
Participants’ responses to the “what is where” question was
significantly above chance in both the 3-min (Binomial test:
p < 0.001; 97% of the participants answered this question
correctly) and 1-h trials (Binomial test: p < 0.001; 91% of the
participants answered this question correctly), and did not differ
as a function of trial type (χ2 = 1.42, df = 1, p= 0.285). In other
words, participants’ memory about where the popsicle and raisins
were hidden was not the limiting factor in their performance.
Discussion
We developed a questionnaire version of the what-where-how
long-ago paradigm previously usedwith non-human animals and
preschool children for use with adults. Strikingly, participants
chose the preferred and perishable food (i.e., popsicle) both
after 3-min and 1-h. Participants’ responses to the memory-
check questions revealed that failure to remember what was
hidden where cannot explain our results. One could argue that
participants’ choices of their preferred food after 1-h could be due
to participants’ inability to integrate the temporal information
with their knowledge about the perishability of the food items.
However, it is also possible that temporal information was not
salient enough in the current task. This is because participants
were provided with the duration of the trials in the critical choice
question, but did not actually experience the time between the
hiding of the food items and choosing a container. This is an
important difference between our method and previous studies
using this paradigm. Another possibility is that participants were
not sufficiently motivated by the food “rewards”—note that,
contrary to the studies with non-human animals and children,
our participants were not presented with real rewards but, rather,
photographs of them.
In order to control for these alternative explanations, in
Experiment 2, participants were presented with the same
procedure developed by Martin-Ordas et al. (2017) for use with
children. In this what-where-how long ago task participants
experienced the time between hiding two real food rewards and
choosing one of the containers. As in Experiment 1, we predicted
that if this task draws on episodic memory, participants will
successfully choose their preferred food snack after 3-min and
their less preferred food after 1-h.
EXPERIMENT 2: LAB VERSION
Following Martin-Ordas et al. (2017), we presented adults with
two trials in which they witnessed an Experimenter hiding two
snacks—a preferred, but perishable grape popsicle, and a less-
preferred, but non-perishable box of raisins- in two of three
locations on a platform. Participants were asked to choose from
one of the three locations (i.e., critical choice question) after a
3-min or 1-h retention interval (RI) and to answer a series of
memory questions about “what” we hid, “where,” and “how long
ago” we hid it (i.e., memory-check questions). Importantly after
3-min, the popsicle was still edible, whereas after 1-h it was not
(i.e., it had melted).
Crucially the current paradigm also allowed us to investigate
participants’ correct choices—this measure was the equivalent of
scrub jays choosing worms or peanuts in Clayton and Dickinson
(1998)—as well as participants’ recollection of behavioral
components of episodic memory—this measure being similar
to those assessed in previous studies with humans. In addition,
presenting participants with two trials allowed us to assess how
they respond to an “unexpected” question about a past event
or, what has been termed “incidental encoding” (Zentall et al.,
2001, 2008). We explored this last issue by analyzing participants’
responses in Trial 1—when they were unaware of what the task
would involve–and Trial 2—when they knewwhat the task would
entail. We decided to include this manipulation because it has
been argued that a feature of episodic memory is that recollection
can occur when encoding is incidental and memory assessment
is unexpected (Zentall et al., 2001, 2008). Importantly, recent
studies have shown that manipulating the level of intentionality
during the encoding phase (intentional encoding vs. incidental
encoding) affects recollection for “what,” “where,” and “in which
order” something happened (e.g., Holland and Smulders, 2011;
Craig et al., 2016). Finally, we were also interested in investigating
the relation between the different measures of episodic memory
used in the present study—correct choices in the depletion
paradigm and recollection of the behavioral components of
episodic memory. A positive relation would support the claim
that both measures rely on the same type of memory (i.e.,
episodic memory).
We hypothesized that if participants remember what, where,
and how long ago in an integrated manner (e.g., Clayton
and Dickinson, 1998; Clayton et al., 2003), they would choose
the popsicle (preferred food) after 3-min has passed and the
raisins (less-preferred food) after 1-h has passed. Since the
intentionality at encoding has been shown to affect recollection
(e.g., Holland and Smulders, 2011), we expected participants to
perform better in the second trial compared to the first—both
in terms of correct choices and responses to the memory check
questions. In particular, we predicted that those participants
who received the 1-h RI in Trial 1 (i.e., experienced the
melted popsicle) should perform better on the 1-h RI in
Trial 2, than those who received the 3-min RI in Trial 1.
Finally, if our measures (i.e., correct choices, responses to the
memory check questions) tap the same type of memory (i.e.,
episodic memory), then scores on these measures should be
positively correlated. Although previous studies have investigated
the relation between what-where-in which order, free recall,
and source memory tasks (e.g., Cheke and Clayton, 2013),
our study is the first to investigate the relation between
the responses used in episodic-like memory tasks in animals
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FIGURE 1 | Percentage of adults who chose the box containing the popsicle or the box containing the raisins in the critical choice question grouped as a function of
retention interval (RI) and trial type. Note that choosing the popsicle in the 3-min trial was considered correct and choosing the raisins in the 1-h trial was considered
correct.
and the responses used in episodic-like memory tasks in
humans.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-five University undergraduates were recruited; 11 were
excluded due to food preference (e.g., they did not like raisins,
they liked raisins more than popsicles) or failure to attend both
sessions, resulting in a final sample of 24 (15 females; 9 males). All
participants were predominantly White, middle class, and fluent
in English. The research was approved by the Office of Research
Ethics and Integrity at the University of Ottawa. Participants
provided written informed consent.
Materials and Procedure
We used the exact same materials and procedure as in Martin-
Ordas et al. (2017). There were three different cardboard boxes
(∼12 cm wide × 19 cm long × 8.8 cm high each) and a wooden
platform (91 cm long× 75.5 cm wide) in which three holes (5 cm
diameter) were drilled and then covered with a plastic netting (see
Figure 2). This plastic netting allowed liquid (from the melting
popsicle) to pass through and collect inside a cup that was hidden
under the platform. The experiment took place in two rooms:
Room 1, where the hiding event took place, and Room 2, where
the participants waited either 3-min or 1-h—depending on the
type of trial.
Participants received two trials separated by five to seven days
and each trial consisted of five main events: (1) food preference
test, (2) hiding event, (3) critical choice question, (4) memory
check questions and, (5) “how long ago” question.
1. Food preference test. E and participant sat facing each other.
E placed a box of raisins (4.6 cm long × 3.4 cm wide × 1.7 cm
high) and a popsicle (3 cm long× 2.5 cm wide× 1.5 cm high) on
two small dishes and asked participants “Which one of these two
snacks do you like best: popsicles or raisins?” Note that at this point
participants did not receive either food item. Next, E proceeded
with the hiding event.
2. Hiding event. E placed the three cardboard boxes on the
platform. For each of the two snacks E said: “Look what I have
here! I am going to put it here.” E then placed the popsicle under
one of the three boxes, the raisins under another one and the third
box remained empty. Hiding locations and box locations were
counterbalanced within and across participants. The rationale for
having an empty box was to control for participants remembering
which boxes had food under them. However, participants never
chose the empty box in Trial 1 or in Trial 2.
There were two types of trials defined by the length of
time/RI that elapsed between hiding the food items and allowing
participants to choose one of the boxes (i.e., critical choice):
3-min and 1-h. On the 3-min trials, the popsicle and raisins
were both available (i.e., edible), whereas on the 1-hour trial the
popsicle melted and only the raisins were edible. Fifty percent of
the participants received the 3-min trial first followed by either
the 3-min trial or 1-h trial. The other 50% received the 1-h
trial first followed by either the 3-min or 1-h trial. Thus, the
combination of trial type and order of presentation yielded 4
experimental conditions: 1-h (first) trial and 1-h (second) trial; 1-
h trial and 3-min trial; 3-min and 3-min trial; 3-min and 1-h trial.
Participants were randomly assigned to each of the conditions.
During the RIs, participants went to Room 2 and were engaged
in unrelated activities (e.g., reading). Importantly, before leaving
Room 1, E clearly stated “the door is going to be locked so no one
can go inside the room while we are not there.”
3. Critical choice question. After 3-min or 1-h, E and
participant returned to Room 1 and E asked the participant
the critical choice question, “Now you can have what is inside
one of these boxes. Which one are you going to choose?” Our
critical choice question is analogous to scrub jays being allowed
to retrieve a particular food (e.g., peanuts or wax worms) after
a predetermined RI. In the 1-h trials, and once the box was
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FIGURE 2 | Apparatus used in the present study. The photo depicts (A) the three cardboard boxes and the wooden platform and (B) a detail of one of three holes
and plastic netting.
uncovered and participants had answered thememory-check and
how long ago questions, E asked participants “What happened to
the popsicle?” All participants stated that the popsicle had melted,
thus confirming that they understood the melting process.
4. Memory-check questions. E asked three memory-check
questions to assess whether participants remembered “what”
(“Do you remember what I put under the boxes?”), “where” (“Do
you remember which boxes have something under them?”) and
“what is where” (“Do you remember where the popsicle is? Do you
remember where the raisins are?”). These questions are similar
to those used to measure episodic memory in the studies with
adults. Half of the participants were asked the critical choice
question first and the memory-check questions second, whereas
for the other half this order was reversed. However, only after
participants decided on the location/box they wanted to uncover,
and answered the memory check questions, were they shown the
content of their chosen box.
5. How long ago question. We always asked this question
at the end of the trial, and worded it as follows: “Do you
remember when we were in the other room (i.e., Room 2)?
Did it feel like the time that it takes to brush your teeth, or
like the time that it takes to make dinner and then eat it
with your family?” Similar to the experiment with the children
(Martin-Ordas et al., 2017), E showed participants two pictures
while presenting these two different options; one depicted a
person brushing her teeth, and the other depicted a woman
cooking with her family and then having dinner. To provide
participants with a graphic representation of the duration of the
actions, two lines were drawn under each of the two pictures:
a short line for “brushing teeth,” and a longer line for “making
and eating dinner.” The rationale behind the “how long ago”
question was to assess whether incorrect responses on the critical
choice question (e.g., choosing the popsicle after a 1-h RI) were
due to difficulties estimating the amount of time/duration of
the RIs.
Scoring and Analyses
Trials were video-recorded and participants’ choices were scored
as a function of which box they pointed to first (correct box = 1;
incorrect box= 0).
Critical choice question
Similar to scoring used in previous studies using the depletion
paradigm, choosing the box hiding the popsicle in the 3-min
trials was scored as “correct” because it is the preferred food and
is still edible, whereas choosing the empty box or the box hiding
the raisins was scored as “incorrect.” In contrast, in the 1-h trials,
choosing the box hiding the raisins was considered “correct,” and
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choosing the empty box or the box hiding the popsicle (which had
melted and was no longer edible) was considered “incorrect.”
Memory-check questions (“what,” “where,” and “what is
where”)
Participants received a score of 1 for the “what” question (i.e., “Do
you remember what I put under the boxes?”) if they responded
with both “popsicle” and “raisins.” Any other response was
scored as 0. Participants received a score of 1 for the “where”
question (i.e., “Do you remember which boxes have something
under them?”) if they pointed at the two boxes that contained the
food items. Any other response was scored as 0. For the binding
of “what is where” (i.e., “Do you remember where the popsicle is?
Do you remember where the raisins are?”), participants received a
score of 1 if they pointed at the box containing the popsicle, and
at the box containing the raisins. Any other response was scored
as 0.
“How long ago” question
For the “how long ago” question (i.e., “Do you remember when
we were in the other room? Did it feel like the time that it takes to
brush your teeth, or like the time that it takes to make dinner and
then eat it with your family?”), participants received a score of 1 if
they answered “brushing teeth” after the 3-min trial, and “making
and eating dinner” after the 1-h trial.
Analyses
We used Pearson chi-square tests to analyze performance in
the critical choice question in Trial 1, and also performance
on the critical choice question in Trial 2 as a function of what
type of trial participants received first. We used binomial tests
to assess whether participants were above chance in the critical
choice question, memory check questions (chance = 33%), and
“how long ago” question (chance = 50%). However, because
participants’ performance was at ceiling in the memory check
and “how long ago” questions, correlations between the different
measures could not be calculated. Thus, we used a Friedman’s test
to analyze whether there were differences between the different
measures. To do so, proportion scores (i.e., participants’ overall
success in both trials) were created for the three variables. All
statistical tests were exact two-tailed, and results were considered
significant if p< 0.05.
Results
Critical Choice Question
Performance in Trial 1
Participants performed significantly better in the 3-min trial than
in the 1-h trial (χ2 = 10.66, df = 1, p = 0.001). Binomial
tests indicated that participants chose the box hiding the popsicle
significantly above chance in the 3-min trial (p< 0.001) but failed
to choose the box hiding the raisins significantly above chance in
the 1-h trial (p= 0.37). In fact, 83% of the adult participants chose
the box hiding the popsicle after 1-h (p< 0.001).
Performance in Trial 2 as a function of Trial 1
To investigate the effect of previous experience, we analyzed
performance in Trial 2 as a function of the trial participants
received first. Performance in the second 1-h trial was superior
for those participants who received the 1-h trial first as compared
to those who received the 3-min trial first (χ2 = 5.33, df = 1,
p = 0.021). However, performance in the second 3-min trial was
not affected by whether participants received a 3-min or 1-h
RI in Trial 1 (χ2 = 0.444, df = 1, p = 0.505). Together, these
results show that participants’ choices after the 1-h RI in Trial 2
were significantly affected by which trial they received first (see
Figure 3).
Further analyses revealed that adults in the 1-h RI performed
significantly above chance when they received the 1-h RI in Trial
1 (binomial test, p = 0.017) but not when they received the 3-
min RI first (binomial test, p = 0.35). Those participants who
received the 3-min RI in Trial 2 performed significantly above
chance when they received the 3-min RI in Trial 1 (binomial test,
p= 0.017), but those who received the 1-h trial in Trial 1 did not
(binomial test, p= 0.097).
Memory-Check Questions (“What,” “Where,” “What
Is Where”)
Performance in Trial 1
Participants’ memory for “what,” “where,” and “what is where”
did not differ as a function of trial length. In fact, all participants
correctly responded to these questions in the 3-min and 1-h trials.
Performance in Trial 2
As in Trial 1, participants’ performance on the memory-check
questions did not differ between the 3-min RI and the 1-h RI. As
before, all participants responded to the three questions correctly.
How Long Ago Question
Performance in Trial 1
Ninety-six percent of participants correctly estimated the
duration of the 1-h RI and 100% did so for the duration of the
3-min RI.
Performance in Trial 2
All participants correctly estimated the duration of the trial for
both the 3-min and 1-h RIs.
Relation Between the Critical Choice,
Memory-Check, and “How Long Ago” Questions
Because participants’ performance was at ceiling in the memory-
check and “how long ago” questions, correlations could not be
calculated. Thus, we analyzed whether there were differences
between the overall performance in the critical choice question
(i.e., combined score on Trials 1 and 2), overall performance
in the “what- where-how long ago” questions (i.e., combined
score for these three questions on Trials 1 and 2) and overall
performance in the binding question “what is where” (i.e.,
combined score on Trials 1 and 2). Friedman test of differences
between overall scores on the critical choice question, “what-
where-how long ago” questions, and the binding of “what
is where” was calculated and rendered a χ2 = 51.21, which
was significant (p < 0.001, n = 24). Post-hoc Wilcoxon tests
showed that participants performed worse in the critical choice
question compared to the “what-where-how long ago” questions
(Z=−3.879, n= 17, p< 0.001), and the “what is where” question
(Z =−4.001, n= 18, p< 0.001).
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FIGURE 3 | Percentage of adults who chose the box hiding the popsicle or the box hiding the raisins in the critical choice question grouped as a function of RI and
trial type. Note that choosing the popsicle in the 3-min trial was considered correct and choosing the raisins in the 1-h trial was considered correct.
DISCUSSION
We adapted the what-where-how long ago paradigm previously
used with non-human animals and preschool children for use
with adults. In Trial 1, participants chose the preferred and
perishable food (i.e., popsicle) after the short RI but did not
choose the less preferred, non-perishable food (i.e., raisins) after
the long RI. However, experiencing the melted popsicle in Trial l
improved participants’ performance in Trial 2. We also assessed
recollection for “what,” “where,” “what is where,” and “how long
ago” and found that adults’ performance was at ceiling on these
measures in both trials. Finally, we analyzed whether there were
differences in difficulty between our measures and found that
participants performed significantly worse in the critical choice
question than in the “what-where-how long ago” and “what is
where” questions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two experiments we presented adults with a what-where-how
long ago task. Strikingly, participants struggled to adapt their
food choices to the length of the trial. This was irrespective
of whether they were asked to imagine (Experiment 1) or
actually experienced (Experiment 2) the time elapsed between
the hiding of the food rewards and choosing one of the
containers. Our results show that memory for the contents
of the boxes cannot account for participants’ failures in
the critical choice questions. Rather, Experiment 2 highlights
the role that previous experience might play in depletion
paradigms.
Critical Choice Questions
Participants’ performance on the critical choice questions
in Experiment 1 and Trial 1 of Experiment 2 was rather
unexpected. Although they chose their preferred food after
the short RI, they did not correctly choose their less
preferred food after the long RI. One could argue that
participants may not have been motivated by the food
rewards because they were neither particularly hungry nor
thirsty. Yet, our observations of participants’ reactions in
Experiment 2 were quite the opposite—that is, participants
expressed disappointment upon seeing that the popsicle had
melted. Moreover, when they successfully obtained the reward—
either the popsicle or the raisins—participants consumed it
immediately after the experimenter gave it to them. As such,
we do not think that lack of motivation can account for our
findings.
We can also rule out the possibility that participants
lacked “semantic” knowledge about “melting” given that adults
understand the transformation of certain substances (e.g., ice
melts with time). This understanding was also confirmed
by their responses to the “What happened to the popsicle?”
question in Experiment 2 (i.e., all adults stated that it had
melted). Importantly, in Experiment 2 we found quite a
different pattern of results on the critical choice question
for the second 1-h trial. More specifically, in the 1 hour-
1 hour condition adults’ performance on the critical choice
question of Trial 2 significantly improved. These findings suggest
that participants correctly chose their less preferred food (i.e.,
raisins) only when they had previously experienced the melted
popsicle.
What are the exact mechanisms that can account for
participants’ improvement on the critical choice question of
the second 1-h trial in Experiment 2? One possibility is that
those participants who experienced the melted popsicle in Trial
1 avoided choosing the popsicle in Trial 2—regardless of the
duration of the trial. This seems unlikely though given that
67% of the participants still chose the popsicle in the 3-min
RI in Trial 2, after experiencing its melting (i.e., 1-h RI) in
Trial 1. It also seems unlikely that this improvement was
due to a change in participants’ preferences in the second
trial because participants who received the 3-min trial first
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chose the popsicle in the second trial independently of its
duration.
More plausible is that participants’ experience in Trial 1
subsequently shifted their attention in Trial 2 to the relation (i.e.,
binding) between the elements of the problem (Clayton et al.,
2003); that is, to make a correct choice, participants not only had
to remember the contextual information (i.e., “what,” “where,”
“what is where”) and the temporal information (i.e., “how long
ago”), but also integrate them—“how long ago a particular
food item was placed where.” In fact, whereas one could argue
that participants’ responses to the critical choice question in
Trial 1 could be explained by simply choosing their preferred
food—independently of the duration of the trial- integrating
the temporal information with the contextual information can
conceivably explain their performance in Trial 2. In this sense,
our results do not differ from those reported with the scrub-jays
(e.g., Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). In Clayton and Dickinson’s
experiment, scrub-jays experienced four pre-training trials in
which they had the opportunity to learn that worms degrade and
become inedible after a long time has passed between caching and
recovery. Thus, it is conceivable that becoming aware of how the
passing of time affects the edibility of the food items is crucial to
succeed in a what-where-how long ago task for both humans and
non-human animals. An interesting direction for future studies
would be to address this issue by directly telling participants how
long it takes a popsicle to melt. If becoming aware of the temporal
information facilitates performance in the depletion paradigms,
participants should succeed in this version of the task. Relatedly,
showing that participants’ performance generalizes to other kinds
of “depletion” paradigms that do not use food as stimuli is also
important. For example, one could imagine developing a task
in which there is an electronic device (e.g., i-Pad) that plays a
preferred game/show but that has a battery that runs out quickly
vs. a device that plays a less preferred game/show but has a
longer-lasting battery. If participants do indeed have difficulty
using duration information in their decision-making process
(as we have argued), they should fail to choose the “longer-
lasting” device/less-preferred game after the long delay—just as
participants in our experiments failed to choose the less-preferred
raisins. This pattern of results would suggest that our findings
are not specific to one particular domain of reasoning, such as
“food.”
Memory-Check and How Long Ago
Questions
Consistent with results from previous studies (e.g., Plancher
et al., 2010; Holland and Smulders, 2011; Craig et al., 2016),
adults in our study accurately remembered “what,” “where,”
and “what was hidden where” and, in Experiment 2, also
correctly estimated the length of both Trials 1 and 2—a
novel feature of our study. Consequently, failing to recall this
contextual information cannot account for participants’ poor
performance in the first 1-h trial. Rather, as mentioned earlier,
adults’ difficulty appeared to be rooted in their inability to
precisely use duration information. Indeed, although adults
accurately judged trial duration, they did not appear to integrate
this information to then allow them to decide that, after
1-h, the popsicle will have melted. Thus, using duration
information when deciding which box to choose appears to
be a key to success in the current what-where-how long ago
task.
Incidental Encoding and the Role of
Previous Experience
In Experiment 2, participants’ improved performance in Trial
2 is also consistent with arguments that the memory processes
involved in a first encounter—or “trial,” in the context of our
study—of an event differ from those involved in subsequent
encounters (or “trials”) (Zentall et al., 2001, 2008; Plancher et al.,
2010). Most notably, Zentall et al. (2001, 2008) argued that
deliberate encoding (e.g., use of training phases) helps organisms
develop expectations of future rewards. The development of such
expectations favors the storing of this information as semantic
rather than episodic memories. Thus, in the context of our
tasks, this suggests that when participants do not know what
they are going to be asked, episodic memory is not sufficient to
succeed in the critical choice question (i.e., Experiment 1 and
Trial 1 of Experiment 2); however, when they do know (i.e., Trial
2), participants might integrate the spatio-temporal information
with the non-episodic information (e.g., semantic facts) to make
the correct choice (e.g., “choose the non-perishable food after
1-h”).
These results are not only consistent with adults’ performance
in previous what-where-in which order tasks (Holland and
Smulders, 2011; Plancher et al., 2012; Craig et al., 2016) but also
with preschoolers’ performance in the what-where-how long ago
task (Martin-Ordas et al., 2017). Specifically, children’s successful
estimation of “how long ago” the hiding event took place was
related to successful performance in the critical choice question.
Crucially, this effect was only true for Trial 2 - that is, once
children knew what the task entailed. Martin-Ordas et al. (2017)
argued that children might not spontaneously incorporate the
duration of the trial into their decisions. This finding is consistent
with the results of Experiment 2: Once adults experienced the
melted popsicle, they were able to take into account the duration
of the trial in order to make their choices.
Comparisons Between Our Measures
Experiment 2 also allowed us to investigate the degree of
relation between the different measures used in depletion
paradigms. Adults’ performance differed between the critical
choice question, the what-where-how long ago questions and
the “what is where” question. Participants’ better performance
in the “memory check” questions compared to the critical
choice question also suggests that these measures might tap
different memory systems. In fact, previous studies addressing
the relation between different measures of episodic memory
in adults have also reported such differences (e.g., Plancher
et al., 2010; Easton et al., 2012; Cheke and Clayton, 2013;
Pause et al., 2013). For example, Easton et al. (2012) found that
whereas performance in a “what-where-in which context” task
required recollection of the past event (i.e., episodic memory),
performance in a “what-where-in which order” task did not.
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This finding led the authors to conclude that tasks that rely
on temporal information might be susceptible to non-episodic
strategies.
Although it is true that methodological differences could
account for differences in the results across different studies,
our task highlights the need to gain better consensus about
the “when” component that is measured in episodic memory
tests. Because this aspect has been tested in a variety of
ways in both the human and animal cognition literatures,
it is difficult to compare performance on this measure
across studies. For example, whereas time of day (Roberts
et al., 2008) or duration (e.g., Clayton and Dickinson, 1998)
have been the main temporal markers used in the animal
research, order of events (e.g., Cheke and Clayton, 2013;
Mazurek et al., 2015; Craig et al., 2016) has been the main
temporal marker used in previous “episodic-like” memory
tasks with adult humans. Because these different temporal
markers might require the involvement of different memory
systems—as the current and previous studies suggest, comparing
performance across studies is difficult. As such, an important
goal for future research and theorizing is to more consistently
operationalize the temporal component of the episodic memory
system across studies. This is especially important when
trying to validate methodologies previously used in the animal
literature.
CONCLUSION
Our episodic-like memory depletion paradigms showed that
adult humans successfully took into account retention interval
when deciding whether to choose a non-perishable or perishable
food—but only after having experienced the event once before
(i.e., 1-h RI in Trial 1 of Experiment 2). Consistent with previous
findings, our results also showed that participants successfully
remember episodic components of an event (e.g., “what,” “where,”
“what is where”) and also, a new aspect of our task (Experiment
2), “how long ago” a particular event happened. These findings,
therefore, suggest that recalling what-where-how long ago and
deciding which food item to choose might rely on different
memory systems.
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